The War Belarus Wages Without Firing a Shot
By: Giorgio Provinciali
Live from Ukraine ????????
Ovruch From the Belarusian border, new roads and artillery positions are visible, and drones are arriving.
No soldiers yet, but this may not be the point.
Commenting on the latest report from the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyj, President Zelenskyconfirmedthatthe Russian Federation may be attempting to drag Belarus back into war.
Accordingto publicly available intelligence,Belarusian engineers are building roads into Ukrainian territory and establishing artillery positions along the border.
This could bea diversion to keep the Ukrainian military on alert, prompting central command to move more troops north and away from the steeper slopes where the Russian Armed Forces are refusing to advance, even at enormous human cost. However, among civilians in Ovruch and other border towns,the risk of a repeat of the scenario seen in February 2022 is considered real, especially afterBelarusian dictator Aliaksandr Lukashenkocalledon reservists to perform military service,explainingthat males under 27 who have not already completed their mandatory military service are no longer entitled to an extension.
Supporting this interpretation of events areRussias ongoing infiltration attempts along the entire border with the regions of Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv, aimed at creating a buffer zone. Although Moscow currently lacks the forces to implement such plans, it is likely that in the long termit intends to extend the buffer zone to the perimeter of Belarus as well.
The critical point, however, is that the map of Russian pressure is expanding and concerns not only the Northeast but a broader plan forperipheral destabilization.
Although no breakthrough attempt from the unrecognized region ofTransnistriahas been recorded, Alla Perdei and I have alreadydocumentedfrom the field the presence ofspy balloons and FPV reconnaissance dronesidentical to those we see here in Ovruch. This phenomenon is frequent enough to prompt the local population of those border settlements to impose a stricter curfew than the current one. The ongoing Russian attacks on the Maiaky Bridge and the infiltration of saboteurs and raiders into Ukrainian Bessarabia alsosuggestthat the Moscow regimes objectives asindicatedon a blackboard during a briefing by Lukashenko himself in the early stages of Russias full-scale invasion of Ukraine remain the conquest of the regions of Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia. To create favorable conditions for the realization of such aggressive ambitions (which also included the fall of the Ukrainian capital), it is therefore clear thatthe Russians have included the creation of buffer zones in the Vinnytsia, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr regions in their plans.
The situation reported by the 14th Army Corpsin the Myropillia area of Sumy Oblast remains complex, and incidents ofkidnapping Ukrainian civilianshave already spread to other inhabited settlements in the border areas, in addition to Hrabivske. These advances are limited to approximately 11.5 km from the state border, which the Ukrainian Armed Forces are managing to contain and slow, but which still allow the Russians to move to new positions.
Its a mechanism consistent with the war weve been witnessing for years: the Kremlin doesnt always seek a breakthrough where it threatens; very often, it seeks to saturate its adversarys decision-making, preventing the adversary from simultaneously pursuing axes that are too far apart.
In this sense,Belarus can serve as a massive lever of indirect attrition for Moscow.
Even without launching a mass offensive, its enough to force Ukraine to commit forces to the north that could otherwise reinforce Donbas, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson.Minsks military value for Moscow remains enormous, even if only as a rear area, a pressure area, and a logistical and psychological platform that Ukraine lacks. Long-range Russian drones regularly arrive from there,usingrelays positioned within Belarusian borders (such as the four recentlydestroyedby the Kyiv Armed Forces) to support these attacks. This is a now consolidated pattern of Russias war in Ukraine, reaffirmingthe need to separate formal entry into war from actual military co-functionality.
It would be naive to interpret Presidential Decrees №67 of February 23 on spring conscription and №132 of April 17 on the recall of reserve officers, bothsignedby Lukashenko, as automatic proof of his countrys imminent declaration of war.
Formally, these texts are part of the standard conscription cycle ofa country that already provides all kinds of assistance to the regime that unleashed the war in Ukraine. However, they constitute a political-military signal that complements a more concrete one, the construction of roads.
Evidence of a common strategic function evident in areas as distant from each other as those examined in this article. A multidirectional pressure that Ukraine will have to continue managing through an extensive and costly defense in terms of personnel and attention.
Within this interpretation, Sundays nighttime attack on Chernihiv (whichkilleda 16-year-old and injured others) is crucial because it prevents us from making a conceptual error: thinking that, since a large mechanized column ready to invade isnt visible from the North today, that flank is secondary.
This isnt the case.
The North may not be the main axis of the breakthrough, but it remains a vital axis of Russian terror. The point, then, isnt simply whether Minsk will formally enter a war it has always supported, but rather recognizing thatMoscow already derives a military dividend from the mere possibility of doing so.
Putins regime relies on the survival of another, which Moscow sees as an operational tool and an expendable pawn. Lukashenko is not an equal ally but a disposable asset that Moscow simply needs to keep afloat. Consequently,Belarus is not only a potential invasion line but also a Russian strategic asset already active against Ukraine.
In 1.516 days of war,we recorded over 250 videos from ground zero and wrote more than 1,500 articles.
We are doing our best to provide genuine, first-hand reports from zones where almost no press dares to go. This means living in a kill zone constantly. We take the risk, but without your invaluable support, our voices would remain unheard and silent. Without brave people sharing our articles from afar, they would remain unread. Our reports would go unseen, and our efforts would be lost. Theres still a lot of work to do here, as the people around us are also in no better situation.
Were renewing ourfundraising campaignand thanking everyone who joins us in helping to restore what Russia is destroying. Moving forward with only a small reimbursement for each article from a brave newspaper that believes in us is extremely challenging. Thats why we are grateful to all the kind people who support us and trust in our mission.
Even a small donation helps.
Well keep you updated on developments.
Thank you all, dear friends ????????
白俄罗斯未开一枪而发动的战争
作者：Giorgio Provinciali
翻译：旺财球球
乌克兰前线报道????????
奥夫鲁奇从白俄罗斯边境望去，可以看到新修的道路和炮位，无人机也频繁出现。
尚未见到士兵，但这可能并非重点。
在评论乌克兰武装部队总司令奥列克桑德尔西尔斯基的最新报告时，泽连斯基总统确认，俄罗斯联邦可能正试图再次将白俄罗斯拖入战争。
根据公开情报，白俄罗斯工程兵正在修建通往乌克兰的道路，并在边境沿线架设炮位。
（图：Alla与我在白俄罗斯边境的乌克兰一侧版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
这可能是为了牵制乌克兰军队、让中央指挥将更多部队调往北方，从而远离俄罗斯武装力量即便付出巨大人员代价仍然拒绝推进的关键战线。然而，在奥夫鲁奇及其他边境城镇的平民中，人们普遍认为重复2022年2月情景的风险是真实存在的，尤其是在白俄罗斯独裁者亚历山大卢卡申科召集预备役服役、并宣布说27岁以下且尚未完成义务兵役的男性不再有延期服役权利之后，这种担忧进一步加剧。
进一步印证这一判断的是，俄罗斯沿切尔尼希夫、苏米和哈尔科夫整个边界地区持续发动渗透行动，企图建立一个缓冲区。虽然莫斯科目前缺乏实施此类计划的兵力，但长期来看很可能打算将缓冲区延展至白俄罗斯周边。
关键在于，俄罗斯施压的地图正在扩大，所涉及的已不仅限于东北方向，而是更广泛的外围扰乱计划。
（图：大约两个月前，Alla与我在奥夫鲁奇报道版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
尽管尚未记录到来自未被承认的德涅斯特河沿岸地区的突破性进攻，阿拉佩尔代和我已在实地记录到间谍气球和FPV侦察无人机，与在奥夫鲁奇所见完全相同。这一现象频繁发生，促使边境定居点的当地居民实施比现行更严格的宵禁。俄方对迈亚基桥的持续攻击以及破坏分子和袭击者渗入乌克兰贝萨拉比亚的事件，也表明莫斯科政权的目标，正如卢卡申科本人在俄全面入侵乌克兰初期一次简报中黑板上所示仍是占领敖德萨、尼古拉耶夫、赫尔松和扎波罗热等地区。为创造有利条件实现这些侵略性野心（当中也包括夺取乌克兰首都），显然俄方的计划里已包括在文尼察、基辅和日托米尔地区制造缓冲区。
（图：白俄罗斯总统亚历山大卢卡申科在向其安全委员会发表讲话时似乎展示了俄罗斯对摩尔多瓦的入侵计划照片来源：纽约邮报）
第14军团报告的苏梅州米羅皮利亞地区的局势仍然复杂，绑架乌克兰平民的事件已从赫拉比夫斯克蔓延至其他边境居民点。这些俄军推进限于距国界大约11.5公里范围内，乌克兰武装部队正在设法遏制并拖慢其进展，但仍不足以阻止俄军占据新阵地。
（图：Alla与我在被俄联邦摧毁的赫尔松海军学院报道版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
这一机制与我们多年来目睹的战争模式一致：克里姆林宫并不总是在它威胁的地点视线突破；很多时候，它试图通过饱和对手的决策空间，使其无法同时在过于分散的多个轴线上进行防御或反击。
在这一意义上，白俄罗斯可成为莫斯科实施间接消耗战的巨大杠杆。
即便不发动大规模攻势，仅靠迫使乌克兰将兵力部署到北线，就足以使这些兵力无法增援顿巴斯、扎波罗热和赫尔松。明斯克对莫斯科的军事价值仍然巨大，即便只是作为后方区域、施压空间，以及乌克兰所缺乏的后勤与心理平台。俄远程无人机经常从那里起飞，利用设在白俄罗斯境内的中继站（例如被最近基辅武装部队摧毁的四处中继）支持俄军袭击。这已成为俄罗斯对乌战争中的既定模式之一，进一步证明应把正式参战与实际上的军事协同区分开来。
（视频：我在乌克兰奥夫鲁奇报道版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
将卢卡申科在2月23日签署的第67号总统令（春季征兵）和4月17日签署的第132号总统令（召回预备役军官）简单解读为其国家即将正式宣战的自动证据，是幼稚的。
在形式上，这些文件属于一个早已全面支持侵略乌克兰政权的国家常规征兵周期。然而，它们构成了一个政治军事信号，与另一个更为具体的信号相辅相成即道路的修建。
这表明，如本篇文章所谈及的那些地理位置相距甚远的地区，其战略功能依然高度一致。这是一种多向的压力，乌克兰将不得不通过耗费巨大和昂贵的人力与注意力的广泛防御继续应对。
（图：Alla与我在乌克兰苏梅州比洛皮利亞报道。俄军也试图在此渗透版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
在这种解读框架下，周日对切尔尼希夫的夜间袭击尤为关键。袭击造成一名16岁少年死亡并多人受伤。袭击的意义在于阻止我们犯一个概念性错误：认为既然北方目前看不到一支准备入侵的大型机械化纵队，那么该侧翼就是次要的。
事实并非如此。
北线或许不是突破的主轴，但仍然是俄方恐怖行动的关键轴线。因此，问题不在于明斯克是否会正式加入它一贯支持的战争，而在于认识到，莫斯科已从仅仅存在这种可能性中获得了军事收益。
普京政权依赖另一个政权的存续，莫斯科将该政权视为一种可被利用的工具和可牺牲的棋子。卢卡申科并非平等的盟友，而是一个保持其勉强存续的可弃棋子。
因此，白俄罗斯不仅是潜在的入侵通道，还是一个已对乌克兰发生作用的俄罗斯战略资产。
（图：我在乌克兰奥夫鲁奇郊外拍的一张照片，位于靠近白俄罗斯边境版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
***
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