Military Lexicon Evolves for Modern Warfare. Except For Those Still Fighting With History
By: Giorgio Provinciali
Live from Ukraine ????????
Chernivtsi The front as a distinct line is dissolving into areas of mutual infiltration that can extend more than 10 km. Using a phrase surprisingly identical to ours, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyj, on Wednesdayformalizedin a publicposton his Facebook profile a paradigm weve been describing for months.
Word for word, precisely on November 11, 2025, wedescribedin the same termsa front that can no longer be seen on maps, later defining it asa system of shifting gradientsand realshades of graythat extend well beyond the line of contact.
The current situation is such that both Syrskyj and President Zelensky have approved another expression now common in our daily reports: the one that describescontrol as a dynamic conditiondependent on ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance), jammers, and FPV operators.
In its latest official communiqus, the Ukrainian General Staff hasstandardized, even lexically, the definition of gainsachievedin offensive operations, such as the one that last month allowed it toregain controlof more than 400 km of Ukrainian territory.
Russian rhetoric has also evolved in recent months.
While continuing to claimconqueredsettlements that they often do not consistently or fully control,Moscows propagandists increasingly avoid depicting the war as a straightforward, continuous advance. Instead, they prefer to describe actions ofcleansing,pressure, andconsolidationin areas where control remains irregular, contested, and heavily reliant on surveillance, interdiction, and remote engagement capabilities.
It could not be otherwise.
When control of the terrain ceases to be absolute and becomes a function of ISR persistence, the effectiveness of electronic warfare, and drone availability, even military language ends up chasing the real physics of the battlefield.
For this reason,continuing to interpret the Russian war in Ukraine using twentieth-century categories no longer captures its true structure.
There are no longer just front lines and rear areas in the traditional sense; instead, there are zones of varying vulnerability, deadly transit routes, temporarily passable corridors, and areas where control shifts from hour to hour depending on the electronic sky and available vectors.
A look at our latest video reports shows howa position can be officially in Ukrainian hands yet still be under Russian saturation: for example, those recorded in Balabyne illustrate how, over three months, a settlement outside Zaporizhzhia that was firmly in Ukrainian hands has become so heavily saturated with Russian drones that it is now uninhabitable despite being covered by anti-drone nets.
Similarly,a sector declaredoccupiedby the Russians can remain unusable for their logistics, vulnerable to Ukrainian FPVs, and therefore removed from any genuine operational stabilization: what we documented on the edge of the Pokrovsk kill zone is sufficient proof of this.
It is precisely in this context that we should interpret the lexicon used by Kyiv regarding the 400+ km of territory over which the Ukrainian Armed Forces have claimed to haveregained control. This isnt a straightforward reconquest achieved through continuous advances of infantry and equipment, but rather the reactivation of a local advantage capable of denying the Russians effective use of that area, reducing their freedom of movement, and making any effort at consolidation uncertain.
In other words,control goes to whoever can see better, strike deeper, jam enemy communications, and maintain their drones and sensors presence on the target for the longest time.
Syrskyj has officially recognizeda reality that has long been evident on the ground. Zelensky has successfully translated this into political and industrial terms, emphasizingthe need to boost the production of drones, munitions, and electronic warfare systems, thus establishing Ukraine as a global leader. Becauseif the front is no longer a line, then control over space is determined by the technological density each side can project within those shades of gray.
Not by the number of soldiers deployed.
It is precisely here thatRussian propaganda aims to make up for Moscows military failures. Having now lost more men and territory than it can recover after months of stagnation on many fronts,the Russian regime is trying to push forward mainly through a narrative, ultimately conflicting with its own leader. In his latestlong and productivephone call with Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin turned the simple presence of small groups intoconquests, the contest over an area into aseizure, and the systematic destruction of cities far from the front lines into evidence of claimed strategic superiority. With the first occupant of the White House, the Russian dictator mentioned theimminent conquest of Donbas: in reality, the Russian offensive led to the dropping of a 500-kg aerial bomb on the center of Kramatorsk and three more against Sloviansk, resulting in at least four civilian deaths and around thirty injuries, including many children.
Adapting military lexicon to modern warfare is not within the scope of either Putin or Trump.
From the reasons given by both for launching their respective military operations in Ukraine and Iran to the way they feared unprecedented consequences, both demonstratedthey speak the same language.
That of another century.
Tagging my dear friend
to support the already commendable and extraordinary information work hes doing.
Hugs, my friend.
军事词汇随现代战争演进，唯独仍与历史交战者例外
作者：Giorgio Provinciali
翻译：旺财球球
乌克兰前线报道????????
切尔尼夫齐乌克兰武装部队总司令奥列克桑德尔瑟尔斯基周三在其Facebook公开号中指出，传统意义上清晰可辨的前线正在逐渐消失，取而代之的是纵深可超过10公里的双向渗透地带。他所使用的表述，与我们数月以来提出的观点几乎如出一辙。
确切地说，早在2025年11月11日，我们已用同样的措辞描述了一个在地图上再也看不见的前线，更应将其定义为由不断移动的梯度结构和真正的灰色地带组成的体系，其范围远超接触线。
当前形势已使西尔斯基与总统泽连斯基均认可了我们每天报道中日渐普及的另一种表述：即将控制描述为一种依赖于情报、监视与侦察（ISR）、干扰器和FPV操作员的动态状态。
在其最新的官方公报中，乌克兰总参谋部甚至对进攻行动中所获成果的定义在词汇上采用了统一的术语，例如宣称上月夺回控制超过400多平方公里乌克兰领土。
（奥列克桑德尔西尔斯基在Facebook）
俄罗斯的宣传话语近月来也在演变。
尽管仍然宣称已征服某些定居点，但这些地方往往并未被其持续或完全控制。莫斯科的宣传机器越来越少把战争描述为线式持续推进。而更倾向于将行动描绘为在控制仍然不稳定、存在争夺且高度依赖侦察、封锁与远程打击能力的地区进行的清理施压巩固行动。
这种变化实属必然。
当对地面控制权不再是绝对的，而转为取决于ISR的持久性、电子战的效能与无人机的可用性时，连军事语言也不得不追随战场的实际物理逻辑进行调整。
因此，继续用二十世纪的范畴去解读俄罗斯在乌克兰的战争，无法再把握其真实结构。
传统意义上的前线与后方不复存在；取而代之的是不同脆弱性区域、致命通行路线、暂时可通行的走廊，以及根据电子空域和可用投放载体而随时变换控制权的地带。
（视频：我们在撰写本文前三个月左右在扎波罗热巴拉比内录制了这段视频版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
（视频：我们在撰写本文前数周于扎波罗热巴内录制了这段视频版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
从我们最新的视频报道可以看到，一个据官方宣称属于乌克兰的阵地可能仍受到俄方饱和打击：例如在巴拉比内拍到的影像显示，三个月内这处原本被乌方牢牢掌握的扎波罗热近郊定居点被俄方无人机严重饱和打击，以致尽管布设了反无人机网，仍变得无法居住。
同样，一处被俄方宣称占领的地段，可能依然无法用于其后勤活动、易遭乌方FPV攻击，因此无法实现任何真正的作战稳定性：我们在波克羅夫斯克杀伤区边缘所记录的情况便足以证明这一点。
（视频：我们在撰写本文前三个月左右在乌克兰扎波罗热录制了这段视频版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
正是需要在这样的背景下来理解基辅对乌军宣称夺回控制400多平方公里领土相关表述所真正的含义。这并非通过步兵与装备的连续推进而实现的简单收复，而是重新激活一种局部优势，使俄方无法有效利用该区域、限制其机动自由或巩固阵地。
换言之，控制权属于能更好地观测、更深度打击、干扰敌方通信并能使其无人机与传感器在目标上维持存在的一方。
（图：Alla与我一同从乌克兰防线报道，其前后只有铁丝网????????版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
西尔斯基正式承认了一个在前线得到反复验证的现实：泽连斯基成功将这一现实转化为政治与产业层面的战略，强调需提高无人机、弹药与电子战系统的产能，从而确立乌克兰的全球领导地位。因为如果前线不再是一条线性边界的话，空间控制便取决于各方能在这些灰色地带投射的技术密度而非部署的士兵数量。
正是在这一点上，俄罗斯的宣传机器试图弥补莫斯科军事层面的失败。在多线陷入长期僵持、损失的人力与领土已超出其可收复范围后，俄政权主要依靠叙事推动进展，而这种叙事最终与其领导人自身互相矛盾。在与唐纳德川普的最新一次长谈且富有成效的通话中，弗拉基米尔普京将小规模部队的闪现描述为攻占，将局部争夺称为夺取，并把远离前线的系统性城市毁灭当作其战略优越性的证据。与白宫首席住客通话时，俄国独裁者声称顿巴斯即将被攻下：但现实是，俄军攻势是将一枚500公斤空投炸弹落在克拉马托尔斯克市中心，另有三枚落在斯洛维扬斯克，造成至少4名平民死亡、约30人受伤，其中包括许多儿童。
调整军事词汇以适应现代战争既不在普京议程之列，也不在川普议程之列。
无论是两人提出对乌克兰与伊朗发动各自军事行动的理由，还是他们对所谓前所未有后果的恐吓方式，都表明他们讲的是同一种语言只是属于上一个世纪的语言。
（图：@realdonaldtrump在Truth上的贴文）
（图：弗拉基米尔普京在2022年2月24日发表演讲的片段。完整版：https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1qS6J-WbTD8）
在此提及我亲爱的朋友Dylan Combellick，以支持他已开展的令人赞赏且卓越的信息工作。
拥抱你，我的朋友。
***
持续的停电严重损坏了我们在乌克兰西部的家中的供暖系统，而我们当时就在顿巴斯。
没有电，点着的炉火无法通过水泵循环热水。结果，系统起火，整个房子面临着烧毁的风险。幸而未被烧毁，但整个系统需要更换，房子也需要修复。管道都是歪的，墙壁被烟雾熏黑，供暖系统无法正常工作，需要彻底更换。
我们正在尽最大努力，因为Alla的父母住在那里，但这里还有许多工作要做，周围的人处境也好不到哪儿去。
我们正在重启筹款活动，感谢每一位支持我们修复被俄罗斯摧毁一切的朋友。即使是小额捐款也有帮助。我们会及时更新进展。
感谢大家，朋友们。
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在过去的三年里，我们一直在乌克兰战争的各个前线进行报道
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