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雪上加霜:加拿大生产力放缓,人人有责

(2026-04-25 23:23:12) 下一个

雪上加霜:加拿大生产力放缓,人人有责

https://economics.td.com/ca-productivity-bad-to-worse

Beata Caranci,高级副总裁兼首席经济学家 | 416-982-8067

James Marple,助理副总裁兼高级经济学家 | 416-982-2557

2024年9月12日

要点

如果加拿大不努力提高劳动生产率,就可能面临生活水平持续下降、工资停滞加剧以及公共服务严重恶化的风险。

自疫情爆发以来,大多数行业的劳动生产率都出现了显著下降。

商品生产部门占了绝大部分。令人惋惜的是,该部门过去十年的生产力优异表现如今却因自2019年以来平均每年下降1.2%而黯然失色。为了生产出相同水平的产出,商品生产部门需要更多的工人。

在各行业中,建筑业表现最差,劳动生产率接近30年来的最低水平。

如果不能加大创新力度并进行行业重组,建筑业日益增长的影响力将使加拿大在与其他国家竞争中处于劣势。

加拿大的服务业增速也有所放缓,但程度较轻。与美国相比,大多数主要行业都严重落后。

图1是一张柱状图,显示了加拿大在四个时间段(1989年至1999年、1999年至2009年、2009年至2019年以及2019年至2023年)内每小时实际产出(劳动生产率)的年均增长率。1989年至1999年这十年间,加拿大的劳动生产率年均增长率为1.6%;1999年至2009年为1.0%;2009年至2019年为1.2%。自疫情爆发以来的四年间,增长率已降至0.0%,图中快速下降的箭头突显了这一事实。

一提到“生产率”,人们往往会联想到用更少的人完成更多的工作这种负面形象。对于政策制定者来说,要让加拿大人对这个概念产生热情并非易事,更不用说让他们为了解决问题而做出必要的财政牺牲和政策调整了。然而,生产力的健康增长是构建充满活力、繁荣昌盛且具有韧性的社会的关键。生产力的提升能够推动实际工资增长,并且对于维持高质量的公共服务至关重要。

因此,自疫情爆发以来,加拿大经济表现的显著恶化应该引起所有加拿大人,尤其是年轻一代的严重关切。以人均实际GDP衡量,加拿大2023年的生活水平低于2014年。如果生产力增长停滞不前,工人的工资将无法增长,政府收入也将无法满足支出需求,这将迫使政府提高税收或削减公共服务。

那么,加拿大究竟出了什么问题?

在疫情爆发前的十年里,加拿大商业部门的生产力以每年1.2%的可观速度增长(图表1)。但自2019年以来,生产力增长已完全停止,这使得加拿大成为发达经济体中表现最差的经济体之一,更不用说与美国形成了鲜明对比(参见之前的报告)。

我们多么希望能够告诉大家,只有少数几个行业是罪魁祸首。然而,问题却十分普遍。与疫情前十年的增长相比,只有少数服务业的业绩有所改善。商品行业的从业者受到的影响最大,自疫情爆发以来,他们的生产率出现了倒退。这意味着什么?如今,要获得同样的产出,工人需要投入更多的时间。这在数字化时代简直难以置信。

在加拿大,有一个行业比其他行业更显突出:建筑业。由于其在经济中的占比不断扩大,生产率的下降已成为整体经济疲软的重要根源。

在服务业中,大多数行业自疫情爆发以来生产率都有所下降,但程度不及建筑业严重。尽管如此,与美国相比,关键服务业仍然存在显著差异。

由于生产率低下问题已十分普遍,因此没有灵丹妙药可以解决加拿大的生产力困境。人们常说的解决方案看似直观,但对加拿大而言却难以实现:促进竞争、留住技术工人、减少贸易和投资壁垒(包括国内和国际壁垒),以及改善技术采纳的激励机制。这是避免加拿大沦为七国集团(G7)“穷亲戚”的最低要求。

然而,重点需要放在建筑业,尤其是住宅建筑。该行业主要由小型企业组成,而这些企业采用新技术的速度较慢。建筑业的生产力一直最弱,而该行业小型企业占比最高。针对增长瓶颈制定有针对性的策略可能大有裨益。协调各省的建筑规范和许可要求有助于增强竞争,同时提高整个行业的规模效益。

对于服务业而言,对非永久居民的过度依赖似乎导致了产品价格的下跌。

自疫情爆发以来,生产力持续下降。这在劳动力老龄化的大背景下似乎有悖常理,但大量非永久居民集中在低收入工作岗位上,确实加剧了加拿大生产力的下滑。<sup>1</sup> 提高服务业生产力增长需要支持性的税收和监管政策,以鼓励更多投资并加速技术应用。

自疫情爆发以来,商品行业的生产力有所下降。

图2为柱状图,显示了商品生产和服务生产部门在两个时间段(2009-2019年和2019-2023年)内每小时实际产出(劳动生产率)的年均增长率。在疫情爆发前的十年(2009-2019年),商品生产行业的年均劳动生产率为1.4%,但在疫情爆发后的十年(2019-2023年)下降了1.2%。服务生产行业的年均劳动生产率增长率也从疫情爆发前的十年的1.2%放缓至疫情爆发后的0.6%。

加拿大的经济主要以服务业为主。这并非什么新鲜事,而是稳步发展的趋势。但另一方面,过去二十年间,商品部门(包括农业、公用事业、制造业和建筑业)的总活动占比已从占加拿大经济的三分之一下降到四分之一。

然而,就生产率而言,商品部门的表现却远超其规模。其劳动生产率比服务业高出30%以上。其中,资本密集型的??采矿业、石油和天然气开采业以及公用事业部门尤为突出。相比之下,制造业、建筑业和农业的生产率则低得多。

不幸的是,自疫情爆发以来,除农业、林业、狩猎和渔业外,商品生产行业的生产率增长不仅放缓,而且出现了倒退(图表2)。在疫情爆发前的十年里,这些行业的年均增长率为1.4%,而疫情爆发后,年均增长率却下降了1.2%。

因此,自疫情爆发以来,商品部门每年平均拖累加拿大整体生产率增长0.4个百分点。如果该部门保持平稳,加拿大的生产率年增长率本应达到0.5%。尽管这一表现仍远逊于五年前的水平,但足以超越欧元区。

建筑业生产率已持续下降数十年。

图表3以柱状图的形式展示了五个商品生产部门——农业、林业、渔业和狩猎业、采矿和油气开采业、公用事业、制造业以及建筑业——在两个时间段(2009-2019年和2019-2023年)内每小时实际产出(劳动生产率)的年均增长率。在疫情爆发前的十年(2009-2019年),农业生产率的年均增长率为4.4%,但此后已放缓至2.1%。在疫情爆发前的十年里,采矿、石油和天然气开采业增长了1.9%,但疫情爆发后的几年里,该行业每年萎缩0.5%。公用事业在疫情爆发前的十年里增长了1.6%,但疫情爆发后的几年里,该行业每年萎缩2.2%。制造业在疫情爆发前的十年里增长了1.3%,但疫情爆发后的几年里,该行业每年萎缩0.4%。最后,建筑业在疫情爆发前的十年里仅增长了0.4%,但疫情爆发后的几年里,该行业每年萎缩2.6%。

图表3详细分析了这个问题。自疫情爆发以来,公用事业部门经历了显著恶化,但这并非主要担忧领域,因为其主要原因是创纪录的高温导致2023年水力发电量下降。<sup>2</sup>

令人担忧的行业首先是采矿和油气开采,这两个行业在疫情爆发前的十年中生产率稳步增长,但此后每年下降0.5%。尽管衡量该行业的生产率颇具挑战性(见下方文本框),但加拿大的情况也存在一些独特之处。该行业的投资下降部分原因是关键基础设施项目(例如Keystone XL输油管道)被取消,部分原因是碳定价和能源转型导致投资减少。<sup>3</sup> 虽然能源转型是必要的,但脱碳可能会进一步抑制该行业的投资。鉴于该行业相对较高的劳动生产率,这无疑将在未来几年给加拿大带来生产率方面的挑战。

制造业相对于疫情前的平均水平而言,降幅最小,但该行业的生产率也经历了由增长转为下降的转变,尤其是在过去一年中出现了急剧下降。此外,建筑业的生产力在所有商品行业中垫底。这种长期存在的趋势愈演愈烈,由于其在经济活动中占比不断上升,给加拿大带来了更大的痛??苦。

建筑业的生产力在过去一段时间里没有实现任何增长。

From Bad to Worse: Canada's Productivity Slowdown is Everyone's Problem

https://economics.td.com/ca-productivity-bad-to-worse

Beata Caranci, SVP & Chief Economist | 416-982-8067
James Marple, AVP & Senior Economist | 416-982-2557

September 12, 2024

Highlights

  • If Canada does not play to win on labour productivity, it risks a continued drop in living standards, worsening wage stagnation and a dangerous deterioration in public services.
  • The pronounced downshift in labour productivity since the pandemic has manifested in most industries. 
  • The goods-producing sector accounts for the lion’s share. In a turn of fortune, a decade-long outperformance in productivity is now marred by a 1.2% average annual decline since 2019. More goods sector workers are required just to produce the same level of output.
  • Among industries, construction is the worst of the lot with labour productivity at a near 30-year low. 
  • Construction’s deepening presence will keep Canada on its backfoot relative to peers in the absence of greater innovation adoption and a reshaping of the industry.
  • Canada’s service sector has also slowed, but to a lesser degree. Compared to the U.S., most major industries severely lag.
Chart 1 is a bar chart showing annual average growth in real output per hour worked (labour productivity) in Canada over four time periods: 1989 to 1999, 1999 to 2009, 2009 to 2019, and finally 2019 to 2023. Labour productivity in Canada grew by 1.6% annually in the decade from 1989 to 1999, 1.0% from 1999-2009, and 1.2% from 2009 to 2019. In the four years since the pandemic growth has fallen to 0.0%, a fact emphasized in the chart by a rapidly falling arrow.

Hearing the word, productivity, often brings to mind a negative image of accomplishing more work with less people. It’s a hard sell for policymakers to get Canadians fired up on the concept, let alone to make the necessary financial sacrifices and policy adjustments toward solutions. Yet, healthy growth in productivity is key to a dynamic, prosperous, and resilient society. Productivity improvements drive real wage growth and are essential to maintaining quality public services.

So the fact that Canada’s performance has deteriorated so materially since the pandemic should be of grave concern to all Canadians, particularly younger generations. Canadian’s standard of living, as measured by real GDP per person, was lower in 2023 than in 2014. Without improved productivity growth, workers will face stagnating wages and government revenues will not keep pace with spending commitments, requiring higher taxes or reduced public services.

 

So what ails Canada? 

Over the decade prior to the pandemic, business sector productivity grew by a respectable rate of 1.2% annually (Chart 1). Since 2019, it has ceased to expand at all, setting Canada apart as one of the worst performing advanced economies, not to mention in stark contrast to the United States (see earlier report).

We wish we could tell you that only a single or handful of industries are the culprit. However, the woes are widespread. Relative to growth in the decade prior the pandemic, only a few service industries have managed to improve their performance. Those working in the goods sectors have felt the downshift the most, where productivity has gone in reverse in the years since the pandemic. What does that mean? To get the same output, it now requires more hours from workers. Hard to believe this could occur in a digital age.

There is one sector in Canada that wears the Scarlet Letter more prominently than the others: construction. Due to its increasing size within the economy, its declining productivity has been an increasingly important source of overall weakness. 

Among service-producing industries, most have experienced a productivity slowdown since the pandemic, but not as severe. Still, when compared to the U.S., stark differences occur in key service industries.

There is no silver bullet to fixing Canada’s productivity woes because the underperformance has become so pervasive. The often-cited solutions are intuitive but elusive for Canada: fostering competition, retaining skilled workers, reducing barriers to trade and investment (both internally and externally), and improving incentives for technology adoption. This is the minimum needed to keep Canadians from being the poor cousins of the G7.

However, a focus needs to be on the construction sector, especially residential building. It is composed mainly of small firms, which are slower to adopt new technologies. Productivity has been weakest in building construction, which has the largest share of small firms. Targeted strategies to address constraints to growth could be beneficial. Harmonizing building codes and licensing requirements across provinces could help increase competition while allowing for greater returns to scale across the industry.

For service industries, greater reliance on non-permanent residents appears to have contributed to the productivity deterioration since the pandemic. This may seem counterintuitive amidst an aging labour force, but the concentration of non-permanent residents in low paid work has worsened Canada’s productivity performance.1 Raising productivity growth in services will require supportive tax and regulatory policy that encourage greater investment and accelerate technology adoption.

Goods sector productivity has contracted since the pandemic

Chart 2 is a bar chart showing annual average growth in real output per hour worked (labour productivity) in the goods-producing and services producing sectors over two time periods: 2009-2019 and 2019 to 2023. Good-producing industries saw annual labour productivity growth of 1.4% in the decade prior to the pandemic (2009-2019) but have fallen by 1.2% in the years since (2019-2023). Services-producing industries have seen labour productivity growth slow from 1.2% annually in the decade prior to the pandemic to 0.6% in the years since.

Canada’s economy is primarily one of services. This is not a new development, but one that is steadily marching forward. The flip side of that coin is that over the past two decades, the combined activity of goods sectors — agriculture, utilities, manufacturing, and construction — has fallen from one-third to a quarter of the Canadian economy.

In terms of productivity, however, the goods sector punches above its weight. Labour productivity is over 30% higher than in the service sector. Bragging rights go to the relatively capital intensive mining, oil and gas extraction, and utilities sectors. Manufacturing, construction and agriculture have much lower levels of productivity by comparison.

Unfortunately, since the pandemic, with the exception of agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing, productivity growth within goods-producing industries has not only slowed but has outright reversed (Chart 2). From an annual increase of 1.4% in the decade prior to the pandemic, it has declined by 1.2% annually since. 

As a result, the goods sector has subtracted an average of 0.4 percentage points from Canada’s overall productivity growth every year since the pandemic. Had the sector just stayed flat, Canada’s pace would have risen 0.5% annually. Although this performance still pales to that of five years prior, it would have been sufficient to outpace the Euro Area.

Construction productivity has been in decline for decades

Chart 3 is a bar chart annual average growth in real output per hour worked (labour productivity) in five goods-producing sectors – agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting, mining and oil and gas extraction, utilities, manufacturing, and construction – over two time periods: 2009-2019 and 2019 to 2023. Agriculture experienced annual average productivity growth of 4.4% in the decade prior to the pandemic (2009-2019) but has slowed to 2.1% annually in the years since. Mining, oil and gas extraction experienced growth of 1.9% in the decade prior to pandemic but has contracted by 0.5% annually in the years since. Utilities experienced growth of 1.6% in the decade prior to the pandemic but has reversed at a rate of 2.2% annually in the years since. Manufacturing grew by 1.3% in the decade prior to the pandemic but has pulled back by 0.4% annually in the years since. Finally, construction, which grew by just 0.4% in the decade prior to the pandemic, has fallen by 2.6% annually in the years since the pandemic.

Chart 3 breaks down the problem. The utilities sector experienced a signficant deterioration since the pandemic, but this is not a primary area of concern as it was largely due to record-high temperatures that led to a decline in the production of hydroelectricity in 2023.2

The sectors of concern start with mining and oil and gas extraction, which experienced healthy productivity gains in the decade prior to the pandemic but has since fallen 0.5% annually. While measuring productivity in the sector is challenging (see text box below), there are some attributes unique to Canada. Investment in the sector has fallen in part as key infrastructure such as the Keystone XL pipeline was cancelled, but also as a result of reduced investment in the wake of carbon pricing and the energy transition.3 Although this is a necessary transition, decarbonization is likely to further weigh on investment in the sector. Given its relatively high level of labour productivity, this automatically presents a productivity challenge for Canada over the next several years.

Manufacturing is experiencing the smallest decline relative to its pre-pandemic average, but here too productivity has swung from gains to losses, with a particularly sharp drop over the past year.

And then there’s the construction sector, which has experienced the worst productivity of any goods sector. This is a longstanding pattern that has worsened, injecting more pain into Canada due to its rising share of economic activity.

Construction has generated no productivity growth over the past forty years! It’s not a uniquely Canadian problem, but rather global in nature. For instance, U.S. productivity growth in construction has been worse relative to Canada over the last 30 years and only slightly better since the pandemic. Studies in the U.S. have shown resources moving from higher productivity regions to lower – the opposite of allocative efficiency. The decline in productivity has coincided with an increase in land-use regulations, suggesting that non-economic factors have played a central role.4,5

The same appears to be true in Canada. For example, as documented by CMHC, there are considerable differences in residential construction productivity across the country, suggesting that differences in regulations and permitting play a role in productivity performance.6 More than other sectors, construction is characterized by very small firms – 40% have fewer than 20 employees (Chart 4). Smaller firms have been shown to have lower levels of productivity and are slower to adopt new technologies than larger firms.7 They also face larger regulatory burdens relative to their size than larger businesses, which materially weighs on productivity.8 There are a number of ‘low-hanging fruit’ barriers to growth in construction such as building codes, permitting and licensing requirements that differ across provinces and make it difficult for firms to operate across jurisdictions. A lack of standardization is another challenge that makes innovation harder to scale up across the industry.

Construction is growing in importance

Chart 4 is a bar chart showing the percent of total firms operating in Canada by the number of employees for the private sector and for the construction industry in 2023. It shows that the private sector has a larger share of firms with 500 and more workers (33% of the total) compared to the construction sector (13% of the total). The construction sector has a larger share of firms with a small number of employees. For example, 15% of construction firms have 0 to 4 employees (8% for private industry), 26% have 5-19 employees (16% for private industry), 17% have 20-49 employees (14% for private industry). For firms with employees from 40 to 499 the numbers are relatively similar between construction and the private sector. Chart 5 is a line chart running from 1990 through 2023 that shows the share of total business sector hours worked by the construction sector and the manufacturing sector. It shows a steady downward movement in the share of hours in manufacturing, which has fallen from over 20% of total hours in 1990 to 12% in 2023. The biggest declines came over the first half of the 2000s. In the construction sector the share of hours fell slightly in the early 1990s but has marched higher since, rising from 10% in 1990 to just under 13% in 2023.

Unfortunately, the poor performance of the construction sector is an increasingly important driver of Canada’s overall productivity story because it is growing as a share of the economy more than other countries (Chart 5). In 2023, the construction sector represented 12.6% of all labour hours worked in Canada, up from 8% in 1997. Isolating to just the goods-producing sector, construction hours worked now exceed those in manufacturing, nearly doubling from 23% in 1997 to 42% of today.

Now consider the increasing shift of resources into construction activity rather than other areas, and the impact on total Canadian productivity intensifies. Adding this “reallocation effect” to the “within-sector effect” described above reveals a construction sector that has subtracted 0.5 percentage points from annual productivity growth since the pandemic. It has accounted for the vast majority of the decline in overall Canadian productivity relative to the pre-pandemic period.

And the problem deepens when we cast an eye forward. Construction is unlikely to become less important over the next five years, or more. Canada suffers from a housing deficit, suggesting a need for more resources to be sucked into the sector. The Bank of Canada’s recent Monetary Policy Report reduced their forecast for overall Canadian productivity over the next two years citing “constraints on housing construction coming from structural factors, such as the availability of land, zoning restrictions and a lack of skilled labour.”9

The rising importance of construction increases the urgency to improve productivity in the sector. But this requires more outside-the-box thinking, including moving to more prefabricated or modular building, developing a reskilled workforce around it, and rethinking the building code to allow for more flexibility in the sources of materials used that maintain the same results in terms of safety and durability. There are examples of this in other countries, such as Sweden, where modular building has a significant presence.10

The Curious Case of Productivity in Canada’s Oil & Gas Sector

Canada’s oil and gas sector has one of the highest productivity levels in the Canadian economy as well as some of the highest wages. Due to the size of its productivity outperformance relative to the rest of the economy, the sector has played an outsized role in driving Canadian productivity. Although the sector has seen labour productivity growth ebb and flow over several decades, it was on an encouraging upswing in the years leading up to the pandemic.11 Nonetheless, a decline in labour hours in the sector weighed materially on aggregate labour productivity growth.

Chart 6 is a scatter-point chart that shows multifactor productivity indexed to equal 100 in 2017 on the vertical access and the WTI benchmark price in Canadian dollars per barrel on the horizontal access. The data for the chart run from 1990 to 2020. Over this thirty year period there is a noticeable negative relationship between the two variables. Higher oil prices are associated with lower levels of multifactor productivity, while lower oil prices are associated with higher levels of multifactor productivity.

Underneath the surface, things get even more complicated. Labour productivity can be broken down into the amount of capital per worker, the skills of those workers, and the technology that determines how inputs (capital and labour) are turned into outputs (termed multifactor productivity or MFP). In the textbook case, lifting productivity growth is simply a matter of increasing the capital and skills of workers and/or spurring innovation (MFP growth). 

But in the real world, the oil and gas sector appears to have a counterintuitive relationship between the amount of capital it adds and growth in innovation. While the sector has consistently increased capital per worker, MFP has generally declined over the past 50 years. How could this be for a sector that has seen a steady stream of innovation from the early-days of steam-assisted gravity drainage in oilsands development to digital oil field technologies recently. 

One reason is that the productivity statistics do not account for the price of the non-renewable resource. As oil prices have risen, companies have been induced to invest more into difficult deposits that take more labour and capital to extract. This shows up in an inverse relationship between oil prices and MFP (Chart 6).

A second reason is that productivity statistics do not account for the non-renewable nature of the resource. Even without the price effect, more labour and capital must necessarily be expended as easier geology deposits are exhausted. This contributes to the statistical underestimation of MFP growth.12

Finally, the sector must increasingly contend with the necessity of reducing its carbon footprint. This requires both investment and innovation – carbon capture and storage as an example – that does not necessarily raise output in the sector. 

All of this suggests caution in interpreting weak MFP in the oil and gas sector and its negative effects on Canadian productivity growth. Labour productivity should be the focus.

A select few service industries have seen faster productivity growth since pandemic

It’s not all downbeat news. A few sectors stand out with improved productivity growth since the pandemic. Among them are wholesale and retail trade, information and cultural industries, accommodation and food services, and real estate, rental, and leasing. Many of these industries were hit hardest by the pandemic with greater employment disruptions, reinforcing the belief that productivity growth is about fewer people. As of 2023, hours worked in retail trade and real estate, rental and leasing was still lower than in 2019.

Chart 7 is a scatter-point chart that shows annual average growth in labour productivity from 2019 to 2023 on the vertical access and annual average growth in real compensation per hour over the same period on the horizontal access. Over this period there is a positive relationship between the two variables. Industries with higher annual labour productivity growth have tended to see faster growth in real compensation per hour.

However, as in the past, gains from productivity are showing up in rising compensation for these workers. Since the pandemic, real (inflation adjusted) compensation per hour has grown faster in sectors with greater productivity growth. Service industries have experienced annual average growth in real compensation of 1.8% compared to 1.0% in goods sectors. The strongest productivity sectors have seen the strongest wage growth (Chart 7). Information and cultural industries have experienced real wage growth of 2.1% annually and accommodation and food services are not far behind at 2%.13

It is too early to say whether the pandemic shock has caused more permanent changes to these industries. Some of the productivity improvement may reflect trends in automation and digitization since the pandemic. This offers hope that as digital technologies and artificial intelligence (AI) are more widely adopted, productivity growth could accelerate. As we have argued (see report), Canada has a significant share of high-skilled occupations that could benefit from considerable improvements in productivity through AI.

Canada lags the U.S. across most industries, especially services

And this is where the big push must ultimately come from. Canada has lagged U.S. productivity growth for the past several decades, but the deterioration has worsened since the pandemic. Since then, the U.S. has seen business sector productivity growth of 1.6% annually, while Canada has failed to produce any advancement. From 2019 through 2022 (the latest detailed industry data available for the U.S), the U.S has outperformed Canada across most major industries.

U.S. productivity has been particularly strong within retail trade, information, and cultural industries (including telecommunications), professional, scientific, and technical services, and accommodation and food services. Although many of these same industries have led productivity growth for Canada more recently, they have consistently and significantly lagged the U.S. over the past two decades. 

The greatest cross-country wedge has occurred within the professional, scientific, and technical services and accommodation and food services. The U.S. experienced accelerated and robust growth of 3.8% for the former and 3.9% for the latter from 2019 to 2022. By contrast, productivity growth in Canada’s professional services sector slowed from its pre-pandemic average. Productivity growth improved in the retail sector, but to a much smaller degree than in the United States.

Some of the challenges are longstanding. Canada has been a laggard in adopting information and communication technology (ICT) and meaningfully slower growth within this area explains much of the growing U.S.-Canada productivity gap in the two decades prior to the pandemic. 

In fact, there’s only one sector that has consistently outperformed its American counterparts over the past decade and through the pandemic: finance, insurance, real estate, rental and leasing (FIRE). In the decade prior to the pandemic, labour productivity in the sector grew by 2.2% annually in Canada compared to 1.0% in the U.S. Since the pandemic, the gap has increased, with growth of 3.2% in Canada and just 0.4% in the United States. Output of the financial sector in the U.S. was impacted to a much higher degree by the Global Financial Crisis, but that does not explain Canada’s more recent outperformance. Some of it may reflect catch up growth, as the U.S. sector exhibits higher levels of labour productivity than Canada. While comparable data on the details between the two countries is only available to 2020, in the five years prior to the pandemic, the sectors in both countries saw similar contribution from investment-driven growth in capital per worker, but Canada’s industry saw relatively faster MFP growth. 

Maintaining A Competitive Tax Regime

An internationally competitive tax system is an important contributor to investment and productivity. Canada made a concerted effort to lower its corporate income taxes in the early 2000s and had lower corporate income tax rates than international peers through the decade that preceded the pandemic. However, this advantage has eroded considerably in recent years as other countries have lowered tax rates. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2018 for example lowered the U.S. corporate income tax rate by fourteen percentage points from 35% to 21%. Several European countries also reduced their tax rates over this period. With these changes abroad, Canada’s average tax rate is now roughly in line with the U.S. and OECD average, but higher than Europe. A tax rate just in line with the U.S. is probably not sufficient to counteract the country’s inherent strengths in drawing in investment and talent. Canada must aim to do better in order to level the playing field.

The profitability of new investments is also influenced by a host of other measures that interact with the tax system, including interest, depreciation, inventory cost, fees, and other deductions. A measure that includes these factors is the marginal effective tax rate (METR).14 Canada’s METR was temporarily reduced below peers by accelerated depreciation measures in 2019, which allowed investment in manufacturing and processing machinery and equipment to be fully deducted from taxes. The deduction was, however, temporary, and is set to be fully phased out by 2028. As this temporary measure expires, Canada’s METR will rise considerably, raising the cost of new investment and weighing on productivity growth.15

Some might wonder if these tax credits have been effective, considering Canada’s deteriorated investment and productivity backdrop over the last several years. The flip side of the lens is to consider how much worse the investment impulse would be in Canada in their absence. Unwinding it would fly in the face of “do no harm” principle, reducing Canada’s competitiveness during a period when the struggle runs so deep. In addition, measurements like the METR do not include regulations or provisions in the tax code that favour certain industries over others. These have also been shown to impede markets signals, weigh on productivity and reduce competitiveness.16

Bottom Line

Canada has seen its productivity go from bad to worse since the pandemic. Labour productivity was temporarily and artificially lifted by pandemic lockdowns in early 2020 when hours were cut more than overall economic activity. But in the three years since productivity has declined every single year, with the decline worsening in 2023 relative to 2022. An outright decline in productivity in the goods sector explains much of Canada’s moribund productivity growth. While the service sector slowed more modestly, this is nothing to crow about. It stands in sharp contrast to the improved performance stateside. 

Addressing Canada’s productivity issues requires comprehensive strategies, including promoting competition, incentivizing technology adoption, reducing barriers to growth across jurisdictions, and implementing smarter regulations. At a minimum, government should focus on doing no harm, maintaining incentives for capital investment. The expiry of the accelerated depreciation allowance (discussed in textbox above) is a move in the wrong direction, raising the cost of new investment. Reforming the tax code more broadly to reduce the cost of new investment should be a policy priority. Focusing on improving productivity in construction sector is particularly urgent due to its growing economic importance. If Canada does not play to win on labour productivity, it risks a continued drop in living standards, worsening wage stagnation and a dangerous deterioration in public services.  

End Notes

  1. Smith, Philip. Accounting for the Decline of Canada’s Real GDP per Capita Since Mid-2022. International Productivity Monitor, Centre for the Study of Living Standards, Spring 2024. Available at: http://www.csls.ca/ipm/46/IPM_46_Smith.pdf
  2. Statistics Canada. “Hydroelectricity generation dries up amid low precipitation and record high temperatures: Electricity year in review 2023.” March 5, 2024. Available at: https://www.statcan.gc.ca/o1/en/plus/5776-hydroelectricity-generation-dries-amid-low-precipitation-and-record-high-temperatures
  3. Wang, W., “The Oil and Gas Sector in Canada: A Year After the Start of the Pandemic.” Economic and Social Reports. Vol. 1, no.7. Statistics Canada. July 28, 2021. Available at: https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/36-28-0001/2021007/article/00003-eng.pdf
  4. Goolsbee Austan and Syverson, Chad., “The Strange and Awful Path of Productivity in the U.S. Construction Sector.” NBER Working Paper 30845, National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2023. Available at:  https://www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c14735/c14735.pdf 
  5. D’Amico, Leonardo and Glaeser, Edward L. and Gyourko, Joseph and Kerr, William R. and Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M., “Why Has Construction Productivity Stagnated? The Role of Land-Use Regulation.” December 30, 2023. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4679195 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4679195
  6. Laberge, Mathiue. “What is Canada’s Potential Capacity for Housing Construction?” Web log. The Housing Observer (blog) (May 16, 2024). Available at: https://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/blog/2024/what-canada-potential-capacity-housing-construction#:~:text=Even%20with%20a%20record%2Dhigh,over%20400%2C000%20homes%20per%20year
  7. Baldwin, John R, Leung, Danny, and Rispoli, Luke. “Canada-United States Labour Productivity Gap Across Firm Class Sizes.” The Canadian Productivity Review. Catalogue no. 15-206-X, no 0.33. March 10, 2014. Available at: https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/pub/15-206-x/15-206-x2014033-eng.pdf?st=WuWeixPT
  8. Tu, Jiong. “The Impact of Regulatory Compliance Costs on Business Performance.” Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada. 2020. Available at: https://ised-isde.canada.ca/site/paperwork-burden-reduction-initiative/en/survey-regulatory-compliance-costs/impact-regulatory-compliance-costs-business-performance-october-2020
  9. Bank of Canada. Monetary Policy Report - July 2024. Bank of Canada, July 24, 2024. Available at: https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/mpr-2024-07-24.pdf
  10. Anderson, Christina. “How and American Dream of Housing Became a Reality in Sweden.” New York Times, June 8, 2024. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/08/headway/how-an-american-dream-of-housing-became-a-reality-in-sweden.html
  11. Due to the size of its productivity outperformance relative to the rest of the economy, movements in resources in and out of the sector can play an outsized role in driving Canadian productivity. In the five years prior to the pandemic one of the key drags on Canada’s productivity was the decline in production and hours in the oil and gas sector.
  12. Gordon, Stephen. “What Explains the Weak Growth in Total Factor Productivity in Non-Renewable Resource Extraction Industries?” Web log. Worthwhile Canadian Initiative (blog) (June 26, 2024). Available at: https://worthwhile.typepad.com/worthwhile_canadian_initi/2024/06/tfp.html
  13. Without productivity growth, increases in wages imply a decrease in relative competitiveness. This is a particular challenge for export-facing industries. As a result of poor productivity growth, the cost of labour relative to output has risen faster in Canada than in the United States, making it harder for Canadian companies to compete at the going exchange rate.
  14. Bazel, Philip and Mintz, Jack. 2020 Tax Competiveness Report: Canada’s Investment and Growth Challenge. The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, September 2021. Available at: https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/FMK2_2020-Tax-Competitiveness_Bazel_Mintz.pdf
  15. Ibid.
  16. Farhi, Emmanuel and Baqauee, David. The Impact of Firm Misallocation on Aggregate Productivity: A Quantitative Analysis. Harvard University, 2020. Available at: https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/farhi/files/misallocation_main.pdf
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